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CHILD NEGLECT IN THE EXERCISE
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Robert Keith Larson*
N EwsPAPER COLUMNS have recently provided reports of two
shocking instances wherein parents have refused to furnish,
or permit others to furnish, medical aid to their children. In one
of these cases, an eight-day old baby boy died before Illinois
welfare authorities could lawfully obtain custody of him for the
purpose of administering a blood transfusion which might have
saved his life.' In the other case, an eight-year old girl remained
in critical condition in a Canadian hospital while her parents
refused to permit a blood transfusion. 2 In both cases, the
parents, members of the religious sect known as Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, based their refusal to permit medical aid upon their
religious conviction that the Bible forbids the use of blood for
food. They expressed the belief that, if the child should die, the
result would be a manifestation of divine purpose. As a conse-
quence, not one of the parents concerned would be likely to suffer
from any feeling of guilt, but the existence of these stories serves
as a sharp reminder of a serious and recurring legal problem
for which a satisfactory and sufficiently comprehensive answer
is yet to be found.
* LL.B., Law School, flarvard University. Member, Illinois and Missouri bars;
Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1 Chicago Daily News, Jan. 14, 1954, p. 3, cols. 1, 2 and 3; Chicago Daily Tribune,
Jan. 14, 1954, Part 1, p. 1, col. 7; Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan. 15, 1954, Part 1,
p. 6, cols. 2 and 3.
2 Chicago Daily News, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 7, cols. 2 and 3.
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The first of the cases mentioned received newspaper treat-
ment for two days; formed the basis for an editorial comment;
and then disappeared from the public consciousness. In the
single report concerning the second, it appeared that the Crown
Attorney threatened to place a charge of manslaughter against
the parents in the event the child should die, but no further report
of the case has been observed. A moment's reflection should be
sufficient to enable most lawyers to guess the probable reason
for the dropping of the matters. Proof that lack of a blood
transfusion was an actual and operative cause of death would be
difficult to establish in any event. Even if proof were easy, a
prosecution might well be regarded as an unpopular one because
of religious overtones and hampering doubts as to what the law
is or should be. It is, therefore, the purpose of this comment to
point up the fact that public welfare authorities ought to be pro-
vided with adequate legal remedies under which they would be
clearly entitled to act promptly so as to safeguard the health of
the child in an emergency case. It also serves to point out the
need for a comprehensive solution to the entire problem of child
neglect as well as to note some of the basic considerations which
ought to go into the draftinm of such a solution.
I. CURRENT STATE OF TRE LAW
On common law principles, a parent who neglects to supply
his child with necessary medical aid, thereby causing death, would
be guilty of manslaughter. Any religious belief in the righteous-
ness of the action would fail if offered by way of jutification.3
This rule is clearly applicable when the parent is intelligent and
informed enough to be aware of modern medical remedies and
of their usually accepted effect. There are indications, however,
in some of the cases that. in the absence of a medical practice
act, quackery resulting in death is not felonious homicide if prac-
ticed by one who has a bona fide belief in the effectiveness of his
remedies, provided these remedies are not practiced rashly or
3 Rex v. Brooks [1902], 22 C. L. T. 105, 9 B. C. R. 13; Reg. v. Senior, 1 Q. B. Div.
283, 19 Cox C. C. 219 (1898) ; Reg. v. Downes, 1 Q. B. Div. 25, 13 Cox C. C. 111
(1875).
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wantonly.4 Strangely enough, although the basic rule for im-
posing liability for manslaughter has been recognized in English
decisions and in American dicta,5 there is, nevertheless, no report
of an American case in which a parent has actually been convicted
for manslaughter in this situation and the existence of several
acquittals6 may serve to indicate a degree of popular sympathy
for the believer whose religious convictions have been so strong.
Statute law, by contrast, does not deal with the effect to be
given to a parent's religious belief in cases of this nature but
there are several kinds of statutes dealing with the obligation of
the parent to care for the child, usually directed toward limiting
parental rights of custody. For example, many states have stat-
utes designed to punish the criminal neglect of a child, usually
making the offense no more than a misdemeanor. 7. Such a statute
might be used to serve as the foundation for a manslaughter
prosecution on the theory that any unlawful act or omission which
results in a death is adequate to raise the crime to the equiva-
lent of manslaughter. Although this so-called "misdemeanor-
manslaughter" rule is in some disrepute as a matter of theory,8
its application here could probably be justified since the unlawful
act which provides a basis for the application would be the act
of criminal neglect, one sufficient in itself to support a man-
slaughter conviction without the aid of the unlawful act doctrine.
While there is some suggestion that, occasionally, such a
statute would not require the furnishing of medical aid as a
"necessary,'' 9 nevertheless courts have usually interpreted the
4 State v. Schulz, 55 Iowa 628, 8 N. W. 469 (1881) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson,
6 Mass. 134 (1809) ; Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 561 (1844).
5 See, for example, State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N. E. 197 (1904).
6 Reg. v. Morby, 8 Q. B. Div. 571, 15 Cox C. C. 35 (1882) ; State v. Chenoweth,
163 Ind. 94, 71 N. E. 197 (1904); and Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93
S. W. 646 (1906), where the neglect was' directed against the defendant's wife.
In each of the foregoing cases, the prosecution failed to establish causation. See
also, Beck v. State, 29 Okla. Cr. 240, 233 P. 495 (1925), where the defendant was
acquitted of the charge of violating a child-neglect statute because of his honest
mistake concerning the gravity of the child's affliction.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 95, and Ch. 68, § 24, will serve as illustra-
tions.
8 Moreland, Law of Homicide (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1952), p. 194.
9 The case of Regina v. Beer, 32 Can. L. J. 416 (1896), supplies this inference.
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term "necessary," as used in such a statute, to include the giving
of such aid.10 It is believed, therefore, to the extent criminal
sanctions are of utility in these matters, that the common law
and statutory provisions may be regarded as roughly adequate
to deal with the parent who, for religious or other reasons, has
denied medical aid for his ailing child when otherwise able to
furnish, or to secure the furnishing of, the same. If anything is
required, it might be a sharpening up of statutory definitions to
make certain that the consequence of child neglect could lead to
conviction for manslaughter.
Prevention of harm being here, as elsewhere, more desirable
than punishment after harm has been inflicted, it is important to
notice that a second type of statute bearing on the matter tends
to indicate the extent of the state's interest in its minor children,
particularly those who are dependent, neglected or delinquent.
Common, in this class, is the provision that all persons under a
stated age are declared to be wards of the state," with an added
provision to the effect that the state may take custody over such
a child, when found neglected or delinquent, by means of the
appointment of a guardian for him. 12  Judicial decisions make
it clear that legislation of this character involves no unconsti-
tutional deprivation of the parental right to the free exercise of
religious belief for this right does not include a liberty to expose
either the community or the child to ill-health or to the possi-
bility of death.'" These statutes then, to some degree, make it
possible to safeguard the welfare of the child.
It was under such a provision that Illinois authorities ineffec-
tively sought to obtain custody of the suffering child in the first
10 Reg. v. Senior, 1 Q. B. Div. 283, 19 Cox C. C. 219 (1898) ; Reg. -v. Downes, 1
Q. B. Div. 25, 13 Cox C. C. 111 (1875); Rex v. Botha [1918], T. P. D. 133 (South
Africa) ; People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903) ; Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Or. 110, 116 P. 345 (1911).
11 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 190.
12 Ibid., Ch. 23, § 196.
Is People ex rel. Wallace v. Tabrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952), cert.
den. 344 U. S. 824, 73 S. Ct. 24, 97 L. Ed. 642 (1952). Similar indications appear
in Morrison v. State, 252 S. W. (2d) 97 (Mo. App., 1952), and in Mitchell v. Davis,
205 S. W. (2d) 812 (Tex. Civ. App., 1947), but the constitutional question was not
properly raised In these cases.
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of the neglect cases mentioned above. The attempt was rendered
useless by the death of the child during normal procedural delays
deemed incident to the processes established by law. Although
the Illinois statute provided that the summons to the parent
should be issued and made returnable "at any time" within
twenty days, 4 it appeared that a hearing could not lawfully be
held that same evening and, since the parents would not waive
their apparent right to delay until the following day,15 there
was no alternative but to wait. Presumably, the objection to an
immediate hearing was that due process required that the
parents be given a reasonable opportunity to prepare and pre-
sent their side of the case. If this was the reason for the objec-
tion, it would seem to have been an entirely unsuitable one in a
case where the parents were clearly ready with their reply.
In any event, it may be seriously questioned whether due
process requires such a delay for, in analogous emergency situ-
ations, certain extraordinary proceedings have been authorized
by law. For example, the Habeas Corpus Act provides that the
writ shall issue "forthwith,"' 16 commanding the jailor to bring
the prisoner before the judge "immediately. "'7 In much the same
way, the Mental Health Code provides that, on presentation of
a petition and doctor's certificate, a judge may order that a writ
shall issue commanding the sheriff to take charge of a mentally
ill person and transport him to a mental hospital,' leaving the
hearing on the petition to come up later so long as it is held within
five days after the detention.19 If liberty and safety can be pro-
tected in this summary fashion, it is difficult to understand why
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 194.
15 The newspaper report of the case indicated that a summons was issued on
January 13th to compel appearance by the parents on January 14th. It was there
stated that the law did not permit a hearing immediately on the evening of January
13th without the parents' consent, which was refused: Chicago Daily Tribune,
Jan. 14, 1954, Part 1, p. 1, col. 7. If, by this statement, It was meant that a hearing
could not be had or judgment pronounced, without consent of the parties, prior to
the return date, the statement would be sound law: Culver v. Phelps, 130 Ill. 217,
22 N. E. 809 (1889).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 65, § 5.
17 Ibid., Ch. 65, § 6.
Is Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91%, § 6-3.
19 Ibid., Ch. 91%, § 6-4.
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life itself could not be protected without the need for suffering
those delays which cause no untoward harm in less urgent
matters.
Aside from parental punishment or interference with parental
custody, there is the matter of the criminal responsibility of the
spiritual adviser who has counselled a parent to rely solely upon
faith as a means of healing. The problem here is one less clear
than that relating to the parent. Although it would seem, on
general principles of criminal law, that such a person ought to
be considered as accessory before the fact to the crime of man-
slaughter, 20 attempts at prosecution on this theory have failed in
every instance..2 1  This apparent inconsistency in the law has
drawn bitter criticism from a recent novelist,2 2 but one possible
explanation may lie in the fact that an insufficient number of cases
have been considered to round out a balanced pattern of acquittals
and convictions. 2 '  Another possible explanation could be that
juries simply do not like to push the application of criminal sanc-
tions so far as to convict one whose only wrong lies in the giving
of spiritual encouragement.
Statutes do not deal directly with the criminal responsibility
of a spiritual adviser who has counselled a parent to rely solely
upon faith as a means of healing his child. They do, however, very
generally govern medical practice and prescribe the qualifications
one must show before he can obtain a license. The question may
arise, then, whether a minister who encourages faith healing is
guilty of some form of illegal practice of medicine within the
20 Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law (West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1934), p. 236.
21 In Reg. v. Beer, 32 Can. L. J. 416 (1896), the accused was acquitted at the
trial. In Rex v. Elder, 35 Man. Rep. 161 (1925), the conviction was reversed. See
also State v. Sandford, 99 'Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1907), where the conviction of a
leader in control of a group was reversed.
22 C. C. Cawley, Fool's Haven (House of Edinboro, Boston, 1953).
23 While this seems to be true of criminal prosecutions for felonious homicide,
some sects have not been reticent about provoking legal battles in which to test
their religious rights. See Waite, "The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's
Witnesses," 28 Minn. L. Rev. 209 (1944). Christian Scientists, on the other hand,
apparently prefer to avoid litigation, depending rather on legislative reform designed
to place their practices on a sound legal basis. See Steinhardt, "Christian Science:
Religious Freedom and State Control," 7 Miami L. Q. 358 at 366 (1953), and Bangs,
"Christian Science Practice-Legality," 25 .J. Crim. Law and Criminology 271
(1934).
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meaning of such a statute. Most statutes provide for an ex-
emption in favor of those persons who minister to the sick by
purely spiritual means, without prescribing any drugs or under-
taking medical treatment of any other sort.24  Hence, in most
cases, the question litigated has been whether the spiritual ad-
viser is a person coming within the exception. A number of
convictions have been reported,25 but none touching directly on
the point at hand.
It should be apparent, then, without regard to the interpre-
tation to be put upon the foregoing decisions, that the present
framework of statutory and common law is not entirely adequate
to protect the neglected child in an emergency case. Under the
present Illinois law, for example, the remedial pattern would
seem to be that welfare authorities may be able to obtain custody
and to minister to the needs of the child but may have to wait
a day or more, when waiting may mean the difference between
death and survival. If the child dies before society is able to
act, local officials may prosecute the parent on charges of man-
slaughter, or on charges of violating a child-neglect statute, with
some chance of obtaining a conviction, at least on the latter charge,
but with the realization that a conviction would probably serve
to make the accused parent appear to be a martyr, at least to
himself and to others of the same religious persuasion. The same
local officials may prosecute, probably unsuccessfully, the spiritual
adviser as accessory before the fact to the crime of manslaughter;
or they may prosecute him, with possible success, for violation
of a medical practice act. If, however, he has confined his action
to spiritual ministrations alone, he must be acquitted under a
statutory exception which Illinois, like many other states, has
provided, even though he is the person who furnished the theory
and nourished the practice of faith healing. In short, if it can
24 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91, § 16v.
25 Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 P. 612 (1911) ; People v. Estep, 346 Ill. App.
132, 104 N. E. (2d) 562 (1952), appeal transferred 409 i1. 125, 97 N. E. (2d) 823
(1952); People v. Handzlk, 410 Ill. 295, 102 N. E. (2d) 340 (1951), cert. den. 343
U. S. 927, 72 S. Ct. 760, 96 L. Ed. 1337 (1952); State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158,
58 N. W. 728 (1894); People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N. Y. 290, 116 N. E. 977 (1917);
State v. Miller, 59 N. D. 286, 229 N. W. 569 (1930).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
be assumed that the objectives of the law are to protect the child
as well as to deter the parent from neglecting him, then neither
objective is, at present, being effectively accomplished.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE SOLUTION
In searching for remedies appropriately designed to provide
a comprehensive solution for the child neglect problem, answers
must first be supplied to a number of pertinent questions. It
would be necessary, first, to determine the limitations, if any,
imposed by federal and state constitutions. Next, as a matter of
policy, an analysis of the desirability of exercising constitutional
power to the limit would be in order. In that connection, there
would be a subordinate question concerning the extent to which
the state is interested in the welfare of its children as well as
the extent to which such children are endangered by the exercise
of religious freedom of the kind here under consideration. These
points, in turn, would force a resolution of doubt over the purpose
to be accomplished, from which it would then be possible to
formulate the remedy, or remedies, which might effectively ac-
complish the desired purpose.
On the first of these points, one dealing with the nature of
constitutional limitations, it might be sufficient to note that many
cases have indicated that the imposition of criminal penalties
against one who, by neglect, has caused the death of an infant,
would not violate the legitimate exercise of religious beliefs as
protected by the First Amendment or any of its counterparts in
state constitutions. 26 Analogy, for this purpose, may be made to
the case of Reynolds v. United States,27 wherein the United States
Supreme Court established the principle that while legislative
fiat may not control private opinions and beliefs it may, none the
less, control actions "in violation of social duties or subversive
26 See the cases cited in notes 3, 10, and 25, ante.
2798 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878). The defendant had there unsuccessfully
challenged a bigamy indictment on the ground that it violated his right to pursue
his religious belief in polygamy. Although the Mormons had renounced polygamy
years ago, at least one "outlaw" cult bad not given up the fight as of last year:
Jessop, "Why I Have Five Wives," Colliers, Vol. 132, p. 27 (Nov. 13, 1953).
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of good order. ' 2S  Similarly, as mentioned above, legislative
action may constitutionally authorize state officials to take pro-
tective custody over a delinquent or neglected child whose parents
are unfit to care for him without violating any parental right to
the free exercise of the latter's religious beliefs.
29
Issues with regard to blood transfusion would, in this respect,
appear to be no different than those underlying other public
health measures which have drawn attack from certain religious
sects on the ground they interfered with the right of the believer
to a life free from the influence of modern medical techniques
to which his religion was opposed. Thus, the practice of vaccina-
tion,30 of fluoridation of public water supplies,3 1 and concerning
the teaching of hygiene in public schools 32 have provoked con-
siderable controversy. As it would seem that the constitutionality
of such public health measures is closely connected with the con-
stitutionality of remedies for solving the problem of child neglect,
the constitutional law doctrines there invoked ought to be con-
sidered in connection with the latter problem.
Assuming, for the purpose, that no constitutional bar exists
to prevent state action, further study of the problem could con-
ceivably indicate that it might be most practical to tolerate certain
practices, or to refrain from punishing those who engage in them,
even though the state possessed an unquestionable prohibitory
28 98 U. S. 145 at 164, 25 L. Ed. 244 at 250.
29 See cases cited in note 13, ante.
30 While the United States Supreme Court, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 19T
U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 858, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905), held that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not bar a state from requiring its citizens to submit to vaccination, the case
did not decide the question from the standpoint of religious objections for none
were made. State courts, however, have usually sustained similar legislation over
the objection that it would violate the guarantee of religious freedom, citing the
Jacobson case as authority. See cases collected in Steinhardt, "Christian Science:
Religious Freedom and State Control," 7 Miami L. Q. 358 at 363 (1953).
31 The cases of DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953),
and Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 116 N. E. (2d) 779 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1953), both
uphold public fluoridation of water supplies over religious objections. See also,
Dietz, "Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California," 4 Hastings L. J.
1 (1952), and Thompson, "Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies," 3 Hastings L. J.
123 (1952).
82 No case deals with this question, but a number of states exempt from such
courses those students whose religious beliefs conflict with the teaching of the
subject matter: Steinhardt, "Christian Science: Religious Freedom and State
Control," 7 Miami L. Q. 358 (1953).
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power. An illustration of this principle is to be found in the
federal law which exempts conscientious objectors from universal
military training.3 3 It is clear that this exemption is not one
founded on constitutional right but rests merely on statutory
exception.. 4  Numerous reasons for the exception probably exist,
including among them the American heritage of great religious
freedom and tolerance, the danger of forging a weak disciplinary
link into the military chain, where a break at the wrong moment
could result in a debacle, and the fact that a threat of criminal
liability would probably not deter the conscientious objector from
violating a law which was contrary to his scruples. Similar
reasoning may be applied to the instant problem for, in devising
a solution, it ought to be remembered that the law should be de-
signed so as to provide some compliance-producing incentive.
Interest in, or concern for, the parent should not, of course,
be permitted to outweigh the state's interest in the child. Despite
the normal tendency to allow the natural parent to have a rela-
tively free hand in the rearing of his offspring, certain limitations
on the parental right to custody have long been evidenced in the
form of compulsory education laws,35 and in the state's power to
reg'ulate the occupations of minor children 6 Over and above
these limitations, it seems clear that the state has such an interest
in its children that, as against the parent's prima facie right to
custody, the state may curtail the free exercise of religion insofar
as it may bring physical3 7 or psychological" harm to the child.
This right of the state to take custody over the child in the
interest of its medical well-being was upheld in the recent decision
3350 U. S. C. A. §456(j).
34 United States v. Alvies, 112 F. Supp. 618 (1953).
35 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 26--1, and, in general,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R.
468 (1925).
36 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944).
37 See cases cited in note 13, ante.
38 A New York court recently interfered with parental custody, over certain non-
religious objections of the parent described by the court to be "philosophical" in
character, In order to persuade a child to submit to a surgical correction of a
deformity in the interest of enhancing the child's psychological well-being: In re
Seiferth, - Misc. -, 127 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (1954).
92
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in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labren 39 where the appointment of
a guardian to give consent to a needed blood transfusion was
sustained despite religious objections offered by the parents. No
interference with a free exercise of religious rights, as protected
by the constitution, was there involved for the parents were left
to believe as they pleased. The child, on the other hand, too
young to have formed any sort of belief, was denied nothing
except custodial care by parents who had been adjudged unfit
for the purpose. The position so taken might be said to be but-
tressed by the view that the taking of custody was not a final
and permanent determination of the parental right 4' for the
decree finding the child to be "neglected" or "delinquent" was
one which could be vacated, at a subsequent date, on a proceeding
which the parents might see fit to institute.
41
To offset any claim that action of the kind there taken would
constitute an arbitrary interference with parental rights it should
be noted that, under such statutes, limitations do exist on the
state's power to take custody. For example, although the Illinois
statute provides that all persons under the age of twenty-one
shall be considered to be wards of the state,42 the procedures there
authorized apply only to those who can be said to be "neglected,"
or "dependent," or "delinquent" children. The mere fact that
a parent is a follower of an exotic religion would not, in itself,
warrant a finding that he is unfit or that the child is "neglected"
or the like. In the absence of a further showing of unfitness,
therefore, the state would have no power, under the statute, to
take custody of the child from the parent. 43 In much the same
way, while the words of the statute would indicate that a finding
that the child is "delinquent" should be sufficient to justify a de-
cree placing custody in the state, there is much by way of dicta and
at least one decision to the contrary effect where the parent has
39411 Il. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952), cert. den. 344 U. S. 824, 73 S. Ct. 24.
97 L. Ed. 642 (1952).
40 Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203, 6 N. E. 830 (1886).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 201. See also the case of In re Tilton,
286 Ill. App. 388, 3 N. E. (2d) 716 (1936).
42 Ibid., Ch. 23, § 190.
43 Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 I1. 328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913).
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remained a fit custodian." To these safeguards, others could be
added. There must, typically, be a definite charge in the petition
under which custody is sought ;4" due process will require that cus-
tomary rules of evidence be followed;," and reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard would be jurisdictional to the successful
maintenance of any proceeding."
Supposing the machinery, present or prospective, to be ade-
quate, there is still a question as to the extent to which the safety
and health of a child would be endangered by permitting its
parents to continue in the exercise of their religious freedoms.
Actually, the question is one of two-fold character, i. e., does the
faith healing practice actually threaten the safety of any person,
and, if so, how many persons are so threatened? As to the first,
the faith healer appears to consider the divine remedy as the most
efficacious one available. To his own way of thinking, he is not
negligent in relying on faith, but rather, has acted to minimize
the danger to his child. Conceivably, a clear showing of such an
attitude could operate to exonerate the faith healer on the ground
that a bona fide belief in the value of his remedy, or an honest
mistake as to the seriousness of the child's affliction, would be a
defense.48  It is notable that, while courts have convicted some
persons of criminal neglect in cases of this type, they have con-
sistently refused to evaluate the divine remedy as a matter of
law,'4 for to do so would violate the First Amendment. Thus it
44 See Madden, Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations (West
Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1931), p. 381, note 59. The question has, apparently, not
yet reached an Illinois reviewing court.
45 People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353, 86 A. L. R. 1008 (1932), cert.
den. 289 U. S. 709, 53 S. Ct. 786, 77 L. Ed. 1464 (1932).
46 In re Coyle, 122 Ind. App. 217, 101 N. E. (2d) 192 (1951), rehearing denied
101 N. E. (2d) 819 (1951) ; People v. Lewis, 260 N. Y. 171, 183 N. E. 353, 86 A. L. R.
1008 (1932), cert. den. 289 U. S. 709, 53 S. Ct. 786, 77 L. Ed. 1464 (1932).
47 People v. Lynch, 223 Ill. 346, 79 N. E. 70 (1906). As in any other case, the
right to notice may be waived by a voluntary appearance: People ex rel. Houghland
v. Leonard, 415 Ill. 135, 112 N. E. (2d) 697 (1953). See also Harris v. Souder,
- Ind. -, 119 N. E. (2d) 8 (1954), for an intimation that, unless the record shows
a lack of jurisdiction in the form of an affirmative statement that no summons was
served, the reviewing court will presume that jurisdiction was properly acquired in
custody cases.
48 See cases listed in notes 4 and 6, ante.
49 United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 64 S. Ct. 882, 88 L. Ed. 1148 (1944).
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, there said: "If one could be sent to
jail because a jury of hostile environment found those teaching false, little indeed
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is clear that the law neither accepts nor denies the sufficiency of
the divine remedy. In spite of this well-established principle, the
state may yet require that the ailing child be furnished with a
particular kind of remedy, i. e., medical attention, without denying
the quality of alternatives.
Assuming that the faith healer would be guilty of "criminal
neglect" in failing to provide "necessaries" in the commonly
accepted sense of that term, it might then be interesting to dis-
cover the number of persons likely to be endangered by this
neglect. While exact statistics are not readily available, 50 it is
apparent that the threat offered by the faith healer is different
from that offered by the ordinary criminal. The latter may act
indiscriminately against the general public; the danger from the
former extends only to those born into or included within the
faith healing sect and the zone ends with the family circle. There
is no wantonness or negligence touching others, as is the case of
the common public enemy. Hence, while it is true that the laws
of the state should protect each individual in order to retain the
respect of the people at large against what the majority considers
to be a real danger, the limited scope of the'danger, and the
absence of wantonness, may be important considerations in devis-
ing protective legal tools.51
Probably no sihgle answer which could be given to a question
as to the purpose to be accomplished would gain general accept-
would be left of religious freedom.... The religious views espoused by respondents
might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines
are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then
the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect." See 322 U. S. 78 at 87,
64 S. Ct. 882, 88 L. Ed. 1148 at 1154. In accord with this principle are the decisions
in State v. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 A. 597 (1905), and in People v. Pierson, 176
N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903). See also Brown, "Plural Values and the Neutral
State: The American Doctrine of the Free Conscience," 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 28 at 29
(1953).
50 According to one source, neither the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses nor the
Christian Scientist group publish any data concerning their membership: United
States Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1953 (U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1953), 74th Ed., p. 57.
51 It must be noted that, if the law is to make any distinction between the parent
who is simply neglectful and the one who acts from religious motivation, it would
seem that a careful definition of religious motivation would have to be made,
difficult though that may be. See In re Seiferth, - Misc. -, 127 N. Y. S. (2d) 63
(1954), where the court distinguished "religious" from "philosophical" reasons.
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ance, but a few matters would probably be agreed upon by most
people, and these may form a basis for clarifying an objective or
policy with respect to the problem. First, most persons would
agree that the child ought to be protected, in health and life, at
least until he became possessed of sufficient discretion to heed his
own conscience in religious matters. Second, it would probably
be agreed that the extent of parental liability, both civil and
criminal, ought to be clarified in the interest of certainty. In
that connection, provision for the punishment of parents would
scarcely be an objective of primary importance for punishment
would neither restore life nor effectively deter "neglectful" re-
ligious action in the future. Third, there would also be agreement.
on the point that existing doubts as to a possible degree of cul-
pability on the part of the spiritual adviser should be set to rest.
Once these objectives have been agreed upon, the problem of
devising adequate remedies should not be too difficult for solution.
Patently, legislative clarification of the law might take any one
of three forms: (1) a hands-off policy; (2) a policy of preventive
action, aimed solely at protection of the child; or (3) a strict
policy of enforcement of all civil and criminal actions against
the parent and the spiritual adviser. The first hardly seems to
represent an adequate discharge of the state's responsibility.
The last, while within constitutional bounds, could seem harsh
and ineffectual to many persons. They would be inclined to argue
that, as the nation has long found it profitable to encourage
individual initiative in commerce, invention, and in the arts, it
should, by the same token, encourage or at least not act to prevent
individual initiative in matters of faith, such as the invocation
of divine agency for healing purposes.
The second policy, in one form or another, would probably
encounter the least opposition. Here it is that the law ought
clearly to provide, at least in the life-and-death cases, for that
same swift response such as is provided under the habeas corpus
writ. Provision for a temporary emergency custody, obtainable
immediately on petition from a local health officer after a hearing
on both sides, might be one possible answer. So long as care is
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taken to preserve due process consonant with the emergency, such
a proceeding would contain no objectionable aspects not already
in the present law. If necessary to counteract the possibility of
officious intermeddling, a companion measure might be framed to
outline the responsibility of the public official who improperly
exercised the power so vested.52
There can be little doubt that a comprehensive, intelligent
clarification of the law relating to child neglect arising from
religious motivation ought to be accomplished. It is recognized
that the selection of effective remedies should be based upon
careful studies of the constitutional and sociological aspects of
the entire problem, studies which yet remain to be made. In the
meantime, however, since existing rules controlling custody pro-
ceedings appear to be too slow in operation to give adequate
protection to the neglected child in an emergency case, such rules
should be worked over and perfected at once so as to prevent the
possibility of unnecessary deaths while the processes of the law
are being put in motion.
52 A note in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 152 on the Kentucky case of Tabor v.
Scobee, - Ky. -, 254 S. W. (2d) 474 (1953), discusses the liability which could
attach to the physician or surgeon who furnished medical aid, or performed an
operation, without the consent of the parents or another acting on behalf of a
minor patient.
